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ABSTRACT
Popularity is the act of being liked. In Popularity: A Bridge Between Classical
and Behavioral Finance, authors Roger Ibbotson, Thomas Idzorek, Paul Kaplan,
and James Xiong (hereafter IIDX) explore the concept of Popularity in capital
market theory. IIDX argue that certain companies have Popular characteristics
that leads to overpricing caused by a Popularity premium. This paper begins
with an overview of the historical methods of asset pricing, starting with the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). It progresses through the expansion of
the model by financial theorists such as Eugene Fama and Kenneth French. Jay
Ritter (1991) has documented the short-term overpricing and long-term
underpricing phenomenon’s in the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market.
However, the explanation for this anomaly is widely up for debate. After
evaluating the prior theories, this paper argues a new explanation: short-term
underpricing and long-term overpricing are a result of Popular characteristics
in IPO firms. A set of twelve IPO firms across three different time periods are
examined for their first-day “pop” return, along with their proceeding longterm returns. While the results of this study are inconclusive, evidence is
found that Popularity may cause these short-term underpricing followed by
long-term overpricing in the IPO market.

Keywords: Popularity, Initial Public Offering, Behavioral Finance, PAPM, CAPM,
Hot Issue Markets, Classical Finance
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POPULARITY
Overview
Popularity is a phrase first coined by Roger Ibbotson and Thomas Idzorek in 2014 in
their article “Dimensions of Popularity.” They describe it as another word for demand, and
that different securities contain more favorable characteristics toward investors. This is a
relatively new financial theory, and many have come before it. This section will discuss
work that authors Roger Ibbotson, Thomas Idzorek, Paul Kaplan, and James Xiong
(hereafter, IIKX) have done in their 2018 book Popularity: A Bridge between Classical and
Behavioral Finance.
The Popularity concept combines concepts from both the classical and behavioral
aspects of financial theory. The classical characteristics can be summarized by risks, which
include any frictions that would drive a rational investor to be averse from particular
securities, such as catastrophic events. The second is frictional characteristics of a security,
such as taxes, trading costs, and asset divisibility. The attributes of behavioral finance
include psychological impacts, which include preliminary biases such as purchasing a stock
because it has a low impact on climate change. Another is cognitive errors that investors
make when they misinterpret information of a stock, such as overvaluing a brand’s value
that is already built into the market price.
This section begins with an overview of classical finance, followed by the
explanation of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Fama-French Three-Factor
model, and the Net Equilibrium theory. Following this is a summary of behavioral finance,
and this section concludes with a study of the Popularity Asset Pricing Model (PAPM). The
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goal of this section is to set a foundational background of the theories and models that the
PAPM expands upon and allow for more context in the case studies.
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Classical Finance
Under traditional financial theory, analysts and scholars operate under the
assumption that all investors are both rational and fully informed. This includes the idea
that investors focus solely on the risk and expected return of an asset, and that any
preliminary biases held by an investor will be quickly arbitraged out of the market.
Classical Finance is consistent with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). There are four
basic principles in classical finance: rationality, risk-free arbitrage, equilibrium, and
efficient markets (IIKX 2018).

•

Rationality: The principle that all investors use logical decision-making to determine
the price of an asset, such as cash flows, expected return, and risk. Characteristics
such as liquidity and tax efficiency are assumed away due to the non-risk aspects of
investments.

•

Risk-free arbitrage: The “law of one price.” It assumes that subtracting transaction
costs, any two assets with the same value, should have the same price.

•

Equilibrium: The assumption that “supply equals demand.” This means that
investors are currently holding the exact amount of the security they desire at the
specified price. Frictionless equilibrium assumes no transaction costs, and therefore
there are no opportunities for a risk-free arbitrage.

•

Efficient Capital Markets Theory: Written about by Eugene Fama in 1970 and is
described as “prices ‘fully reflect’ available information” (Fama 1970). That said,
Fama also notes that “fully reflect” is a loose term, and to be able to test whether a
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market is efficient, this hypothesis must have a different model to explain this
parity.

In classical finance, most models assume rationality and efficient markets. The main
difference is risk-free arbitrage versus equilibrium. Models such as the Arbitrage Pricing
Theory (APT) (Ross 1976), along with the Black-Scholes option pricing model (Black and
Scholes 1973), assume risk-free arbitrage opportunities and the possibility of finding two
assets with an equal payout but different price. The next sections will look at the
equilibrium-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Fama-French Three-Factor
Model. An overview of Behavioral Finance will proceed before summaries of New
Equilibrium Theory (NET), and finally, the Popularity Asset Pricing Model (PAPM).
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Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
Background
The most well-known classical finance equilibrium model is the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM), first written about by William Sharpe (1964) and John Lintner
(1965). This model has been widely used to assess both the cost of capital for firms and
evaluating management portfolios. The model bears intuitive and straightforward
characteristics of asset pricing that can be widely applied, with the underlying observation
that the relationship between risk and return is linear. It operates under four key
assumptions – that individual investors are price takers, there is a single-period investment
horizon, investments are limited to traded financial assets, and that there are no taxes or
transaction costs.
Another popular model before the CAPM was the dividend discount model (DDM)
(Gordon 1963). The DDM was a method of valuing a company’s stock prices based on the
theory that it is worth the sum of all future dividend payments, discounted back to its
present value. This model presented advantages in the way of a simple justification and no
subjectivity – in other words, there is no ambiguity in the DDM. On the other hand, it fails to
recognize systematic risk (beta), which limits its use in the real world. Beta is an important
variable because it cannot be observed and, therefore, cannot be completely mitigated.
The CAPM adds to the model of portfolio choice, often called the mean-variance
model, developed by Harry Markowitz (1959). This model assumes the requirements of
classical finance where investors are risk-averse, and that they care only about the mean
and variance of their one-period investment. As a result, investors select a “mean-varianceefficient” portfolio, which is the portfolio with the lowest deviation, and the highest
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expected return. Building on this, Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) add two assumptions
to the Markowitz model; The first is that all investors choose one specific market rate, and
the second is that there is a risk-free rate, which is also the same for all investors in the
market.

The CAPM formula: Ra = Rrf + βa X (Rm – Rrf), where:
•

Ra = Expected return on a security.

•

Rrf = Risk-free rate.

•

Rm = Expected return of the market.

•

βa = The beta of the security.

Strengths
One of the strengths of the CAPM is its ease of use due to the simplicity of the model.
Given only four variables, it is relatively simple to obtain a working required return for
given securities. Another advantage of the CAPM is that, contrary to existing models, the
variable beta accounts for systematic market risk. It also assumes that investors hold a
diversified portfolio, eliminating the need for a variable of unsystematic
(company/industry-specific) risk.
Shortcomings
The most significant shortcoming in the model is the difficulty in conducting a valid
test of the model (Fama and French 2004). For example, the CAPM states that the risk of
the security/portfolio must be measured against a relative “market portfolio.” However,
the process of determining a market rate for the portfolio is widely up for debate. There are
many interpretations as to what constitutes an assets’ “market portfolio,” as one could
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include consumer durables, real estate, and human capital, in addition to financial assets.
Additionally, whether to use the United States common stocks or instead use a worldwide
market portfolio will also differ the expected return of an asset. Fama and French were
critics of the model because the assumption of one single risk factor limits the usefulness of
this model. They found that, on average, only about 70% of a portfolio’s return is explained
by its beta (Fama and French 1922).
Conclusion
While the CAPM offers a simplistic way to value single-security and portfolio
returns, there are drawbacks in the model that make it far from being applicable in the
real-world. These are the assumptions involved in determining key variables such as riskfree rate, market risk premium, and beta. However, Fama and French expanded the CAPM
to include two new variables with their three-factor model shown below.
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Fama-French Three-Factor Model
Background
The Fama-French Three-Factor model (Fama and French 1992) attempts further to
determine the required rates of return for a given asset. Fama and French add two new
variables to the existing CAPM formula stemming from observations about the relationship
between portfolio returns and market value (size) (Banz 1980), and book-market ratios
(value) (Bhandari 1988).
In 1980, Rolf Banz published a paper to the Journal of Financial Economics that
displayed an empirical relationship between return and total market value of common
stocks, specifically in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The core thesis of this
observation is that smaller firms have historically higher risk-adjusted returns compared
to larger firms, on average. That said, this effect is not linear in market value; the main
impact is when comparing tiny firms to large firms, while there is little difference between
average-sized firms and large firms. In conducting his empirical test, Banz’s sample was all
stocks quoted on the NYSE for at least five years between 1926-1975. See Appendix 1 for
the results of this study.
The second factor in Fama and French’s model comes from Bhandari’s 1988 study
evaluating book-market returns. In this study, a positive correlation between stock returns
and the debt-ratio was discovered after controlling for both beta and firm size. While some
may argue that debt-ratio is simply a proxy for risk, the relationship was determined to be
insensitive to variations in market proxy or estimation technique (Bhandari 1988). The
inclusion of these two concepts led to new variables added to the CAPM formula, size
(SMB), and value (HML).
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The Fama-French 3-Factor model: Ra = Rrf + βa X (Rm – Rrf) + βSMB + βHML, where:
•

βSMB = return spread of small minus big (SMB) stocks, otherwise known as the size
effect.

•

βHML = return spread of high minus low (HML) stocks, otherwise known as the value
effect.

Strengths
Like the CAPM, a strength of the Fama-French model is its ease of use. At the same
time, it effectively applies two new variables to determine the expected return for an asset.
While the CAPM’s beta is only able to explain an average of 70% of a portfolio’s beta, Fama
and French (1992) claim that their three-factor model can explain up to 95% of returns for
a cross-section of equity portfolios of various sizes and styles. This implies that the FamaFrench Three-Factor model is more effective in estimating returns for securities than the
existing CAPM.
Shortcomings
Problems in this model again include the inability to conduct valid tests given the
same shortcomings of the CAPM. Additionally, critics argue that HMB and SMB simply
capture the same risks associated with a beta, or that these are simply persistent mistakes
made by investors and they do not hold any valid correlations to the return. Fama and
French published a paper in 1996 in which they discuss a five-factor model, “Multifactor
Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies.” In it, they reveal that their “main
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embarrassment” of the three-factor model is that they fail to capture the continuation of
short-term momentum anomalies.
Conclusion
Fama-French Three-Factor model does an excellent job of providing two new valid
variables to the CAPM. Still, it lacks the complexity of a model that can be used effectively in
practice. In the next section, Ibbotson, Diermeier, and Siegel (hereafter, IDS) further build
on the core CAPM model in their New Equilibrium Theory (NET).
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Net Equilibrium Theory (NET)
Background
IDS constructed their paper in 1984. The main idea of the framework is, “[the more]
Investors demand an asset, the more desirable the asset’s characteristics” (IDS 1984). In
both the CAPM and Fama-French Three-Factor model, this relates to investors desiring an
asset that has more favorable risk characteristics. However, these models both assume only
costs that are associated with risk. In the NET, however, IDS expand the previous models
by including costs associated from all sources – including “various risks, as well as
taxability, marketability and information costs – affecting all assets in an investor’s
opportunity set – stocks, bonds, real estate, human capital, venture capital, tangibles and
intangibles” (IDS 1984).
NET does not include a mathematical pricing equation or an analysis of each cost.
Instead, it uses supply and demand graphical analysis to determine the validity of the
theory. Instead of viewing supply and demand in terms of demand for capital, they evaluate
their argument in terms of supply and demand for capital market returns. While all
investors should have the same proposed preferences in terms of risk and risk-aversion,
which translates into the same before-cost expected return, investors individually
determine the price of additional costs, otherwise known as frictional factors. The demand
curves they present reveals investor preferences for tangible items such as more liquidity,
less taxation, and so on (IDS 1984).
In Popularity: A Bridge Between Classical and Behavioral Finance, IIKX (2018)
expand upon this theory to provide a formal economic model, while further explaining IDS’
idea mathematically instead of using supply and demand graphical analysis. In their model,
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IIKX build on the rational models of both the CAPM and Fama-French Three-Factor to
include variables involving liquidity and risk anomalies. Higher liquidity is a favorable
characteristic to investors, because the more liquid their asset, the more likely they are to
be able to convert the asset into cash quickly. There are many frictional factors in the risk
anomaly variable, including the following: information costs, search and transaction costs,
divisibility costs, and miscellaneous factors.
•

Information costs: The costs associated with gathering information on the value of a
particular asset.

•

Search and transaction costs: Items such as broker fees or agent commissions in
completing a transaction.

•

Divisibility costs: Associated with larger transactions such as real estate and venture
capital investments, and indivisibility involves investors having to take on a high
amount of residual risk to partake in an investment.

•

Miscellaneous Factors: Other factors influencing costs include human capital,
nonpecuniary costs or benefits, storage, maintenance, or anything else that could
affect the cost of capital.

The NET formula modeled by IIKX: Ra = Rrf + βa X (Rm – Rrf) + βSMB + βHML + βLIQ + βRISKA, where:
•

βLIQ = Return-spread of liquidity for a particular security.

•

βRISKA = Return-spread of risk anomalies for a particular security, given the factors
above.
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Strengths
NET further progresses existing financial theory by adding non-risk related
characteristics such as taxability, marketability, and information costs. With the inclusion
of frictional features, NET gets one step closer to formulating how investors think in terms
of real-world preferences.
Shortcomings
This theory falls short because it does not include any financial modeling or
mathematical equations for the characteristics mentioned (before IIKX’s 2018 expansion of
the argument). Additionally, it lacks behavioral characteristics of investors, which is
another factor that influences investment decisions.
Conclusion
The NET does an excellent job expanding into frictional and non-risk characteristics
of asset-based investor attitudes. However, IIKX (2018) reiterate that these are a subset of
classical attributes, ignoring behavioral characteristics/biases. This next section will
examine these specific biases and idiosyncrasies of behavioral finance that are often
overlooked by financial models.
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Behavioral Finance Overview
Background
Since its inception in the 1980s, behavioral finance has attempted to explain biases,
heuristics, and inefficiencies present in financial markets. The core idea of behavioral
finance is that not all investors act rationally, and instead hold preliminary biases that
influence investment decisions. In 2003, Robert Schiller published a paper to the Journal of
Economic Perspectives detailing the progression of behavioral finance. In it, Schiller argues
that the concept of efficient markets may work in theory, although there is ongoing
evidence that not all investors behave rationally. Appendix 2 proves this assumption by
showing how real stock prices vary significantly from the present values of subsequent real
dividends.
Smart Money vs. Ordinary Investors
The theories in classical finance, particularly involving efficient capital markets,
assumes that all investors are both rational and fully informed. However, this theory does
not work in markets where investors make irrational investment decisions. The thesis
behind why classical finance works are because “smart money” investors, or those who
were rational and fully informed, could efficiently capitalize on arbitrage opportunities
presented by uninformed, irrational “ordinary investors,” which brings the market back to
equilibrium. However, if this were the case, there would not be market bubbles like the
tech crash in 2000 or the financial crash in 2008. There were bubbles in the market created
by irrational preferences, which are explained through behavioral finance.
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Cognitive Psychology
While investors may behave irrationally for a variety of reasons, most involve biases
that an investor may have. Cognitive biases refer to how an investor may think. Most
include systematic errors, such as overconfidence or putting too much weight on recent
experiences, among others (Ritter 2003). These preferences tend to create distortions
(bubbles) in the market. The following is a shorthand list of some cognitive biases’
investors face:

•

Heuristics: Individuals investing for retirement typically allocate their funds using
the 1/N rule, where N is the number of choices for how to invest retirement money.
For example, if there are three funds, two being equity funds, investors will typically
invest 2/3 of their funds into stocks (Ritter 2003).

•

Overconfidence: Investors tend to be overconfident in their ability to price stocks.
This often leads to a lack of diversification among securities.

•

Framing: This involves how particular investment decisions are presented to
investors. For example, if someone sees that ground beef at a grocer is 80% lean,
they will be more likely to purchase it than if it were presented as 20% fat.

•

Representativeness: Investors tend to overweight short-term averages, based on
having recent experience with it.

•

Conservatism: Contrary to representativeness bias, conservatism is when an
investor does not adjust to a short-term change in structure. However, once this
change becomes a longer-term trend, they tend to overreact to this change, resulting
in representativeness bias.
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•

Disposition Effect: This refers to the anomaly where investors decide to avoid paper
losses by holding their assets for longer durations than if they were to realize a
paper gain. In an example from Jay Ritter (2003), if someone purchases a stock at
$30, which then drops to $22 before rising to $28, most people do not want to sell
until the stock rises above $30.

Supply and Demand Imbalances
Other factors that may influence misvaluations come from temporary imbalances in
supply and demand. An example of this is the increased usage of index funds (Ritter 2003).
Index funds force a demand shift because an asset’s demand is no longer relative to an
increase in expected future cash flows. Classical finance would point to arbitrageurs to take
advantage of this imperfect market. However, the effect can be limited, given restrictions
like short sales constraints, or “if there is no guarantee that the mispricing will be corrected
within a reasonable timeframe” (Ritter 2003).
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Popularity Asset Pricing Model (PAPM)
Popularity
The Popularity concept is a culmination of the theories and models above into one,
modeled by the Popularity Asset Pricing Model (PAPM). Popularity builds on classical
finance and the NET, stating that investors prefer lower risk and frictional costs for their
assets. It also includes aspects of behavioral finance, such as different characteristics and
anomalies that investors prefer and are therefore Popular. For example, while risk is
Unpopular, liquidity is Popular (Ibbotson and Idzorek 2014). Popularity can also help
explain temporary market mispricings. The general thesis of this model is that the less
Popular a security is (based on these characteristics/anomalies), the lower the expected
price, resulting in a higher expected return.
In 2017, Ibbotson and Idzorek expanded upon their Popularity theory in their
Popularity and Asset Pricing article. In it, they review well-known premiums and anomalies
across classical and behavioral finance and evaluate if they are consistent with the idea of
rewarding Unpopular characteristics with positive long-term premiums. These are listed
below (refer to Appendix 3 for summarization of these characteristics/anomalies):

•

The Equity Premium: Additional risks from equities compared to other assets such
as bonds and risk-free rates implies that stocks are Unpopular from a risk
perspective, and therefore offer a higher return. This is consistent with the CAPM.

•

The Size Premium: First identified by Banz (1981) and shown in the Fama-French
Three-Factor model, small-cap equities historically have higher returns than their
large-cap peers. Ibbotson and Idzorek (2017) also mention that in addition to higher
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risk, small-cap stocks are less liquid and infrequently covered by analysts (resulting
in higher research costs), which makes them Unpopular.
•

The Value Premium: Fama and French use Bhandari’s 1988 publication to show how
companies with a higher book-market ratio, and therefore a higher value
outperform growth stocks. Critics attribute this premium simply to risk
characteristics, though the relationship is insensitive to variations in market proxy
or estimation technique. Academics debate explanations for this premium, although
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) argue, “the value premium (or glam stock
discount) is the result of systematic suboptimal behavior of typical investors related
to consistent overconfidence/overestimation of future growth of earnings.” Growth
stocks are considered Popular and value stocks Unpopular. The result is that growth
stocks are relatively higher-priced than value stocks.

•

Liquidity: In terms of classical finance, rational investors prefer an asset that is more
liquid. Amihud and Mendelson have documented in their 1986 article that lessliquid stocks outperform more-liquid equities. This is in line with Popularity,
showing that liquidity is Popular, but results in lower returns.

•

Risk Anomalies: Ibbotson and Idzorek (2017) bundle severe downside risk premium
along with the low volatility and low beta anomaly, citing that they work in different
ways. Investors typically do not like stocks with severe downside risk (shown by
more negative coskewness), according to Kraus and Litzenberger (1976). However,
stocks with more negative coskewness yield a higher return. Therefore, the severe
downside risk is Unpopular, which leads to a higher premium paid for stocks with
lower negative coskewness. Looking at the low volatility and low beta anomaly, a
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publication by Baker, Bradley, and Wurger (2011) implies that active institutional
investors intentionally seek a beta higher than one with hopes of outperforming the
market. However, this typically results in a lower return. Investors preferring highbeta stocks means that lower beta and volatility are Unpopular despite an expected
higher return for these equities, consistent with Popularity.
•

Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG): ESG is the difference between ‘sin’
stocks and socially responsible investing (SRI). Stocks with a higher ESG rating are
typically more Popular to investors. Hong and Kacperzyk (2009) studied the returns
of ‘sin’ stocks, finding that these equities produced a substantially higher annual
alpha, arguing that sin stocks typically attract fewer institutional investors and thus
have less analyst coverage. Higher returns in sin stocks mean that while
investments with a more excellent ESG ranking tend to be more Popular, they yield
lower returns.

•

Competitive Advantage, Brand, and Firm Reputation (CABR): Stocks that hold more
desirable attributes regarding competitive advantage, brand, and reputation,
typically are more Popular (and therefore overpriced) in the market. This likely has
to do with the ambiguity around pricing intangible assets such as brand.

•

Momentum: Ibbotson and Idzorek (2017) refer to this anomaly as “consistent with
mispricing, [where] past winners seem to continue to win for a period of time.” An
example of this could be a breaking news headline that captures the interest and
attention of investors. While momentum can push a stock price higher in the short
term, this is usually the result of biases from behavioral finance. Once the price hits
a peak in price that cannot be justified by fundamentals, the price typically comes
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crashing down until the price can stabilize at a more justified level. Buying into
momentum is Popular, despite the ensuing crash that usually occurs once the stock
price exceeds its fundamental valuation.

Assumptions and Conclusions of the PAPM
In their 2018 publication, IIKX expands upon the existing Popularity concept to
build a financial model for their discovery. In their model, they suggest that a market may
be “beyond efficient,” resulting in information that is irrelevant to securities reflected in the
price due to behavior preferences (IIKX 2018). In this model, markets are beyond efficient,
which leads to biased stock prices. A model that contains and allows for some investors to
hold premiums that outperform the market, and for some investors to tilt away from these
premiums, thus underperforming the market, is needed. Assumptions made by the PAPM
are listed below, along with the conclusions of the model.
Assumptions of the PAPM (excerpt from IIKX 2018):

1. Each security has a bundle of characteristics.
2. Investors have preferences regarding these characteristics in addition to their
preferences regarding risk and expected return.
3. All investors use a generalized form of mean-variance optimization that
incorporates preferences regarding security characteristics.
4. All investors have the same forecasts; that is, they hold the same capital market
assumptions (expected returns, standard deviations, and correlations).
5. All investors agree on what the characteristics of the securities are.
6. All investors can borrow and lend at the same risk-free rate without limit.
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Conclusions of the PAPM (excerpt from IIKX 2018):

1. The market portfolio does not maximize the Sharpe ratio among all portfolios of risk
assets.
2. Each investor forms a customized portfolio of the risky asset that reflects his or her
attitudes toward each security characteristic. This portfolio is combined with long
or short positions in the risk-free asset. Portfolio optimization is required to find the
overall investor-specific portfolio.
3. The expected excess return of each security is a linear function of its beta and its
popularity loadings, which measure the popularity of the security based on its
characteristics relative to those of the beta-adjusted market portfolio. The
popularity loadings are multiplied by the popularity premiums, which are
aggregations of the preferences of the investors regarding the characteristics. In this
way, the market aggregates investor preferences in determining the influence of
security characteristics on the expected returns and prices of the securities.

Source: Based on pages 62-63 in IIKX (2018).

Empirical Evidence
IIKX (2018) provide empirical evidence by examining the characteristics and
anomalies of Popularity. Previous literature has not reviewed the aspects of brand value,
competitive advantage, and company reputation. The final in-depth analysis in this section
addresses the stock-specific characteristic; severe downside tail risk (Unpopular).
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IIKX (2018) consider four portfolios formed by splitting the investable universe of
stocks equally among equally populated quartiles. Quartile 1 contains stocks with the most
Popular attributes, while Quartile 4 contains stocks with the least Popular attributes. The
authors note that while a mutually agreed-upon measure of a security’s Popularity does not
exist, they have identified unstudied characteristics that attempt to serve as proxies of
Popularity. These proxies include:

•

Interbrand’s annual “Best Global Brands” report: Interbrand publishes a list annually
of the top 100 brands with the highest estimated brand value.

•

Morningstar’s economic moat ratings: Morningstar’s analysts use several factors to
estimate a company’s competitive advantage rating, then splits each company into
having either a wide moat, narrow moat, or no moat. A company with a wide moat is
Popular, while a company with no moat is Unpopular.

•

Nielson’s Harris Poll reputation quotient: This poll measures the reputation of a
company by consumers through 20 attributes, which form their “reputation
quotient.” IIKX believes this proxy aligns well with the characteristics that investors
seek.

Brand Value

IIKX (2018) use their quartile methodology along with Interbrand’s brand value for
the top 50 companies from 2000 to 2017. The growth of $1 for each quartile is in Appendix
4. As shown, Quartile 4 (lowest brand value) far exceeds the return of the other three
quartiles and is therefore consistent with the Popularity concept.
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Competitive Advantage

Using Morningstar’s economic moat ratings of an average of 1,039 companies, IIKX
(2018) discovered that, again consistent with Popularity, companies that had no economic
moat from July 2002 – August 2017 had the highest level of returns. (Refer to Appendix 5).
Reputation

IIKX (2018), using Nielson’s Harris Poll reputation quotient as a proxy to represent
the reputation of a company, analyzed the reputation quotient for the top 40 and 50 firms
in 2000 and 2017, respectively. In it, they find that the performance of companies in
Quartile 4 has a higher return from April 2000 – August 2017, shown in Appendix 6.
Tail Risk (Coskewness)

Negative coskewness implies that a security will have more substantial losses than
the market when a crash occurs. Subsequently, Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) found that
investors dislike negative coskewness, therefore rendering it Unpopular. While modeling
their study after the empirical analysis conducted by Harvey and Siddique (2000), IIKX
(2018) chose to focus specifically on a 20-year period to evaluate premiums from securities
with a negative coskewness.
Starting from January 1991, IIKX (2018) sorted the investable universe of US stocks
into four quartiles based on their negative coskewness. Quartile 4 (most negative
coskewness) yielded the highest return as a result of their study. To conclude, based on
coskewness, IIKX’s (2018) results are consistent with Popularity and inconsistent with the
risk-return paradigm. See Appendix 7 for a chart of the returns from each quartile.
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Other Characteristics/Anomalies

IIKX (2018) also perform empirical analysis regarding the characteristics of lottery
stocks, beta and volatility, size, value, liquidity, and momentum. Using ten factors to
analyze these characteristics, they find that seven out of ten are consistent with Popularity.
Still, only two are compatible with the classical framework of more risk resulting in higher
returns. The three factors that were not consistent with Popularity – larger companies
based on high assets, high revenue, or high net income – are believed to be coupled with
market capitalization to form valuation ratios (IIKX 2018). This implies that investors are
unable to agree on whether these characteristics are desirable or undesirable uniformly.
Overall, while risk is typically Unpopular, IIKX (2018) note that risk can be Popular in
certain circumstances – though it is likely these characteristics end up dominating the
approximated returns in the stock market.
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Conclusion
This historical study of past theories shows how Popularity encapsulates the
concepts from prior models of classical finance and presents the argument that these do
not work in the real world. Popularity includes investor biases studied in behavioral
finance that explain the anomalies. By laying out a set of characteristics to evaluate both
risk and nonrisk characteristics of asset pricing, IIKX (2018) formulates the PAPM model.
Empirical evidence then determines the viability of this model, as IIKX (2018) finds that the
PAPM is consistent with the Popularity concept and that there is a negative return to
Popularity with an associated premium for the favorable characteristics. In doing so, IIKX
(2018) formulate a model that bridges the gap between classical and behavioral finance.
The next section looks at anomalies and characteristics of the initial public offering (IPO)
market.
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INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS (IPO)
Overview
An initial public offering (IPO) is the event in which shares of a company sell to both
institutional and retail investors in the public equity market. IPOs are typically
underwritten by investment banks that arrange to list shares on a stock exchange. There
have been extensive studies about pricing these offerings. Jay R. Ritter from the University
of Illinois is one of the most well-known IPO pricing theorists. Pricing IPOs is extremely
difficult because there is no “market price” before the listing, and most issuing companies
have little to no operating history (Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter 1994).
There are three main parties involved in the offering: the issuing company, the
investment bank, and investors purchasing the offering. A problem in pricing IPOs is due to
conflicting interests across each party involved. If the price is set too low, the issuing
company may not get the full amount of capital to fund their business operations. However,
if the price is too high, the investor may not get their required return to invest. Even worse,
the investors will become unwilling to purchase IPOs from the investment bank if they
have a history of overvaluing offerings. Therefore, it is the job of the investment bank to
ensure that they fairly price the offering to satisfy all ends of the transaction.
The next section covers three anomalies in the IPO market. The first is the shortterm underpricing phenomenon, which typically results in high first-day returns for
investors. The second is the long-term overpricing phenomenon, where IPOs tend to
underperform the broader market in the long-term. Lastly, the “hot issue” market
phenomenon will be examined, which takes place when irrational investing during specific
hot market periods.
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Short-Term Underpricing Phenomenon
Overview
The average initial (first day) return of IPOs is estimated to be 16.4% (Ritter 1991),
indicating that initial public offerings are underpriced in the short-term. Financial theorists
have attempted to examine an explanation for this phenomenon, although there is no clear
answer. Instead, different theories provide a reason for this occurrence: “The Winner’s
Curse,” dynamic information acquisition, information cascades, reducing legal liability, and
enhancing banker relations with investors.
The Winner’s Curse
One possible explanation for the sometimes-severe underpricing of IPOs is due to
the “Winner’s Curse” phenomenon. When a stock gets issued to the public exchange,
typically, a fixed number of shares get sold at the offering price (Ibbotson, Sindelar, and
Ritter 1994). In this scenario, investors are split into two distinct categories: completely
informed and completely uninformed, referring to knowing the future stock price of an IPO.
Due to the limit in supply on the number of new shares (owned by the informed investors),
the uninformed investors will only be able to purchase a limited number of shares owned
by the informed investors. This leads to the Winner’s Curse because if the uninformed
investors get all the shares they demand, it is a result of the informed investors not wanting
those shares. Therefore, uninformed investors will only purchase the offering if it is
sufficiently underpriced to compensate for this existing bias (Rock 1985).
Dynamic Information Acquisition
Another reason for investment bankers to underprice IPOs is to use the market of
the uninformed investors to help determine the value of the offering, first written about by
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Lawrence Benveniste and Paul Spindt (1989). In the article they argue that underpricing is
a natural consequence of the premarket auction due to the ambiguity surrounding a fair
market price for a stock that has not yet been in the public market. Ibbotson, Sindelar, and
Ritter (1994) agree with this phenomenon and argue that this technique is used by
investment bankers to get regular investors to reveal their valuations. However, they
mention that this is a “dynamic” model because investment bankers use an underpriced
preliminary prospectus valuation to gauge the demand in the market, and then in the final
prospectus, use their information gathered to make only a partial adjustment to the final
offer price. Simply put, if the offer price of an IPO is revised upwards, it is likely more
underpriced, rather than if it is revised downwards. They illustrate this with an example
from Microsoft in which the preliminary prospectus contained an initial offering of $16-19
per share, though the final offering price was $21 per share. The stock ended up closing at
$27.75 on the first day of trading, producing a 32% return (Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter
1994).
Information Cascades
Another explanation of underpricing has to do with investors merely not focusing
on the intrinsic value of a stock, but also whether other investors are interested in
purchasing (Welch 1992). When investors see no one else purchasing an offering, they may
decide not to buy the offering themselves, even if they recognize a potential underpricing.
To prevent this scenario, investment bankers may underprice a new listing to ensure that
new investors will be interested in purchasing, which will then provoke other investors in a
chain-reaction.
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Reducing Legal Liability
The Securities Act of 1933 makes all participants in the offer who sign the
prospectus liable for any material omissions. One way that investment bankers may try to
reduce this risk of a lawsuit is by underpricing IPOs. However, this theory is open to
debate. A study by Philip Drake and Michael Vetsuypens in 1993 examined 93 IPOs that
were sued for misstatements in their IPO prospectus from 1969-1990. The results were
that the average initial returns of these companies were similar to a control set of firms
that did not get sued. However, they note a significant limitation of their study is that they
are unable to observe companies that would have gotten sued had they not underpriced in
their IPO. However, Janet Alexander (1993) conducted a study of computer companies in
1983. She discovered that every firm with a $20 million loss in market value got sued for
approximately 25% of the decline in market value. This implies that underpricing may
make a difference in the likelihood of a lawsuit and could, therefore, be a consideration for
investment bankers when pricing an IPO.
Enhancing Banker Relations with Investors
To satisfy the buy-side end of the transaction, Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994)
argue that investment bankers will underprice IPOs to entice investors into doing business
with them in the future, perhaps at a higher price. Similarly, they argue that investment
bankers take advantage of their market knowledge to intentionally underprice offerings,
which boosts their reputation and marketing of their own firm, at the issuing firms’
expense. A contradiction to this argument is found in a 1989 study by Chris Muscarella and
Michael Vetsuypens that finds when investment banks themselves go public; they tend to
underprice their own offerings.
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Long-Term Overpricing Phenomenon
Overview
While IPOs outperform the market and are underpriced in the short-term, the
contrary is true in the long-term. Jay Ritter’s 1991 study finds that from 1975-1984 the
return of 1,526 IPOs from the first day of trading to three years later was 34.5%, compared
to 61.9% of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Furthermore, Ibbotson (1975) finds that
IPOs offer excess returns in years one and five but computes a negative return in years two
through four. One caveat Ibbotson notes is that his sample (120 companies) was not large
enough, and therefore there is a high standard of error. There is not a simple explanation
for this anomaly—however, Ibbotson, Sandelar, and Ritter’s 1994 article detail two
possible answers.
Excessive Optimism
An explanation for the long-term underperformance involves the ambiguity of
determining an accurate market price for a new offering in its early stages. Because of this,
optimistic investors may attribute a higher valuation to a company based on growth
opportunities, even though they may never come to fruition. As time passes, more
information about the future of an IPOs’ growth opportunities becomes more available, and
this may reduce the difference in valuations among optimistic and pessimistic investors,
lowering the market price.
Impresarios
Robert Shiller (1990) compares the underpricing of IPOs by investment bankers to
create the appearance of excess demand to the promoter of a rock concert trying to make
an “event” out of the offering. To this end, Schiller argues that IPOs are subject to fads and
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hype built in the marketplace. This also could relate to the “information cascades”
underpricing explanation, where investors choose to buy simply because other people are
buying. As a result, this leads to a lower return when investors decide to sell because they
see other investors realizing their gains in the aftermarket.
Conclusion
Overall, Ritter’s (1991) empirical evidence shows that if an investor were to hold an
IPO from the end of the first day of trading for three years, the investor would have yielded
a return of only 83 cents for every dollar invested. There are different interpretations as to
why IPOs are underpriced in the short-term but overpriced in the long-term. However,
Ritter (1991) claims that perhaps IPOs are not underpriced in the short-term, but instead,
the aftermarket is overpriced. Aftermarket overpricing may be caused by the “Hot Issue”
phenomenon and issuing firms choosing to IPO during specific windows of opportunity in
the market.
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Hot Issue Markets
“Hot Issue” markets phenomenon was first put into academic research by Roger
Ibbotson and Jeffrey Jaffe in 1975. “Hot Issue” markets are described as a market having an
abnormally high return for a specific period. This is a problematic anomaly to rationalize,
and even more difficult to predict. Ibbotson, Sandelar, and Ritter (1994) explore three
possible explanations for this phenomenon: changes in firm risk, positive feedback or
“momentum” strategies, and windows of opportunity.
Changes in Firm Risk
One hypothesis is that riskier IPOs are underpriced to a greater extent than those
that are less risky (Ritter 1980). This is likely a result of the ambiguity involved in pricing a
high-risk company with little to no operating history. In this scenario, Ritter (1980) notes
that there might be periods in which firms with more risk go public, therefore resulting in
higher returns for those periods.
Positive Feedback or “Momentum” Strategies”
Another theory to explain a hot issue market is that investors follow “positive
feedback” strategies (Ibbotson, Sandelar, and Ritter 1994). In this scenario, investors
operate under the assumption that IPOs typically lead to high initial returns based on past
experiences. If enough investors believe this is the case, it leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy
of them all bidding up an IPO and riding the momentum that is caused by this only in
during specific periods when this strategy is effective.
Windows of Opportunity
Hot issue markets may also exist due to issuing firms taking advantage of specific
periods in time where investors are more willing to purchase an IPO at high valuation
36

multiples. This results in a high volume of new issues and a willingness for issuers to sell
the offering at below the aftermarket price (Ibbotson, Sandelar, and Ritter 1994). These
opportunities arise only during periods where the stock market is already performing well,
and investor sentiment is high, which may lead them to make irrational investing decisions
based on optimism during a “hot issue” market period.
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Conclusion
The research done thus far draws two main conclusions: IPOs are typically
underpriced in the short-term, but overpriced in the long-term. A variety of hypotheses
attempt to address this phenomenon, which includes the investment banker using IPOs as a
way to impress investors, issuing firms opting to IPO during “hot issue” markets, and
investors merely being overly-optimistic about companies with little to no operating
history. In the next section, I propose an explanation to this anomaly using the Popularity
concept, with IPOs holding specific desirable characteristics to investors resulting in a
Popularity premium.
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EXAMINING POPULARITY IN THE IPO MARKET
Overview
First, the progression from the CAPM formula to the Popularity concept was
examined. Popularity offers a set of investor preferences based on characteristics and
anomalies of securities. Second, empirical performance in the IPO market and existing
possible explanations for the irregularities of short-term underpricing and long-term
overpricing was reviewed. In doing so, parallels between the Popularity concept and the
performance of the IPO market are evident.
Further exploration of this observation will attempt to determine whether the
application of Popularity is valid in the IPO market. Limitations and methods of
examination are defined for the proceeding case studies. Twelve companies are identified,
then the Popularity of each is determined, followed by evaluating the short-term and longterm returns compared to the S&P 500 market index.
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Limitations
Limitations in this study make it difficult to compare to IIKX’s (2018) definition of
Popularity. IIKX’s research divided the investable universe of stocks into four quartiles
based on each Popularity attribute, then ranked them from least-preferable to mostpreferable. However, this does not work in the IPO market for specific characteristics, so
Popularity is derived from a different measure. Some anomalies/components
unmeasurable in the IPO market are brand value, competitive advantage, and company
reputation.
•

Brand Value – Brand value is impossible to determine in the IPO market relative to
IIKX’s definition because companies that IPO are typically young would not appear
in the Interbrand Annual Top 100 lists. Using brand value as characteristic would
require the division of brand value into four quartiles for companies that IPO during
a specified period, which this study does not include.

•

Competitive Advantage – Similarly, Morningstar’s economic moat ratings cannot be
used sufficiently in the IPO market because Morningstar does not provide a moat
rating for smaller and private companies that are pre-IPO.

•

Reputation – Nielson’s Harris Poll reputation quotient also cannot be used due to
the reasons listed above. A reputation quotient for companies before going public
would need to be studied.
Other limitations of this study include the inability to accurately attain IPO data

relative to quartile values for beta and volatility and severe downside risk. Beta
assumptions can only be estimated, and without prior public market history, an IPO’s
beta before going to the public would be impossible to calculate.
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Methodology
Testing whether the Popularity concept applies to the IPO market would help
predict future returns for an issuing firm going public. First, four different IPO’s from three
different periods were selected. They are classified as such: the “Internet Boom” period
taking place from 1997-2000, the “Post-Internet Boom” taking place from 2002-2005, and
the “App” period from 2012-present. It includes the companies listed below: (Note: these
companies are not randomly selected, but instead are a combination of well-known
companies and a random mix of less-known companies).
•

Internet Boom: Amazon.com Inc. (1997), eBay Inc. (1998), United Parcel Service
(1999), Stamps.com (1999)

•

Post-Internet Boom: Netflix Inc. (2002), Axis Capital Holdings (2003), Google Inc.
(2004), Domino’s Pizza Inc. (2004).

•

App Period: Facebook Inc. (2012), Twitter Inc. (2013), Shake Shack Inc. (2015), Snap
Inc. (2017)

Due to the limitations mentioned above, a different measure of Popularity was
determined. First, fundamental analysis of the company before IPO identifies general
investor sentiment for each issuing firm. This research involves examining the issuing
firm’s Form 424B1 Prospectus, along with relevant news articles at the time. Instead of
evaluating each issuing firms’ Popularity characteristics, a company's first-day “pop” is the
proxy to gauge the Popularity of each security at the time of IPO. Specifically, companies
below the 16.4% average first-day return (Ritter 1991) are Unpopular, while companies
above 16.4% are to be Popular (with a 100BPS discretion). The issuing period during each
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firms’ IPO is also accounted for to determine implied investor sentiment that may have
influenced a first-day “pop.” After evaluating the issuing firms’ fundamental traits, first-day
returns, and the issuing period, event time formulated returns for one-month, one-year,
three-years, and five years post-IPO get calculated. The first-day volume versus proceeding
one-month trading volume is also used to determine Popularity. This data is from Yahoo
Finance’s Historical Data Database. I hypothesize that the larger a company’s “pop” is on
the first day, the more overpriced the stock will be in the long-term, resulting in a lower
return compared to the market.
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CASE STUDIES
#1 – Amazon.com (AMZN)
Company Background
Founded in 1994, Amazon.com was originally an online marketplace for books.
When it filed for IPO in 1997, there was no clear path to profitability. Still, they claimed
themselves to be “Earth’s Biggest Bookstore” (Amazon Com 1997). In their 1997
prospectus, they boast about having virtually unlimited shelf space, offering more than 2.5
million titles. Amazon.com also grew to fame when Time magazine rated one of the 10
“Best Websites of 1996.” Also, in the prospectus, they highlight the 100% sales growth from
Q1 1996 through Q1 1997. However, they mention that the company is growing at the
expense of sacrificing profits. They had incurred $8.8 million in losses in years 1996 and
1997, which Amazon.com cites as one of their risk factors.
Issuing Period
Amazon.com went public on the cusp of one of the hottest issuing periods
historically, the dot com boom. Before the bubble burst, investors were excited about any
company with “dot com” in the name. To understand investor sentiment toward IPOs in
this period, the average first-day returns on IPOs in 1996 was 17% but had skyrocketed to
73% by 1999 (Ljungqvist, Wilhelm Jr. 2003). This shift in average first-day returns shows
how investors were not behaving rationally during this time, which led to vast initial
underpricing in the IPO market.
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Findings
The first day of trading AMZN had volume of 72.16 million compared to a 30-day
average volume of 9.238 million. As seen in figure 1.1, AMZN had a 29.97% spike on its
first day of trading (adjusted for return of the S&P 500). Amazon.com’s first-day pop, in
addition to the information above, means Amazon.com was a highly anticipated IPO and
should be considered Popular. Due to the short-term underpricing and consideration of
Amazon.com as a Popular stock at IPO should lead to a lower long-term adjusted return in
comparison to the broader market. However, this is not the case. While the one-month
adjusted return was negative (-25.25%), Amazon significantly outperformed the market
one year, three years, and five years post-IPO.
Figure 1.1 – Amazon.com’s Raw and Adjusted Returns May 15, 1997 – May 15, 2002
Timeframe
Date of IPO

Return
Raw

S&P 500

Adjusted

30.67%

0.70%

29.97%

-19.15%

6.10%

-25.25%

294.90%

32.72%

262.18%

2,642.35%

68.78%

2,573.57%

764.29%

30.34%

733.95%

05/15/1997
One Month
05/15/1997 – 06/15/1997
One Year
05/15/1997 – 05/15/1998
Three Years
05/15/1997 – 05/15/2000
Five Years
05/15/1997 – 05/15/2002

While this is inconsistent with both the Popularity concept and Ritter’s empirical
evidence regarding the long-term overpricing of IPO’s, Amazon may be considered an
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anomaly for the adaptation of its business model. In its prospectus, investors may have
been under the assumption that Amazon would only experience growth through the sale of
books. However, they quickly adapted their site to sell a variety of different products and
opened their doors to third-party sellers in 2000. This changed the growth trajectory of the
company and is what helped turn it into the behemoth company that it is today.
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#2 – eBay Inc. (EBAY)
Company Background
On September 24, 1998, eBay Inc. filed for IPO. At the time, the company was “the
world’s largest and most popular person-to-person trading community on the Internet”
(eBay Inc. 1998). eBay was one of the first companies to create an online marketplace for
both buyers and sellers, using an auction format for users to sell a variety of goods on the
site. Before IPO, eBay was just three years old but had already conducted over 15 million
auctions with gross merchandise sales of $340 million. The company was able to leverage
the technology provided through the Internet to reduce inefficiencies in marketplace
transactions. With only three years of operating experience, the company highlighted its
short lifespan as a potential risk factor in the prospectus. That said, in comparison to
Amazon.com, eBay was cash-flow positive pre-IPO, which made investors particularly
interested in the company.
Issuing Period
Despite issuing about 18 months after Amazon.com, the market was still craving
IPO’s, particularly Internet firms. This made eBay an attractive offering, especially given
their existing profits, which was unique for a high-growth Internet company. A unique
aspect of both eBay and Amazon.com is that they went public right before the height of the
dot com boom, which occurred between 1999-2000. According to Ljungqvist and Wilhelm
Jr. (2003), high-tech companies accounted for about one-third of IPO’s between 1996-1998
but had risen to one-half in 1999-2000. The Popularity of tech IPO’s in the market was
growing over the same period that eBay went public.
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Findings
On its first day of trading, eBay Inc. shares had a volume north of 518 million,
compared with its first-month average of 72.50 million. While investors typically trade a
stock more on the date of its IPO, this is still representative of the amount of anticipation
leading up to eBay’s IPO. On the first day of trading, shares spiked 162.94% from $18 to
$47.33 per share. eBay was already a profit-generating and high-growth company at the
time of IPO, and their first-day pop makes eBay Inc. Popular. Therefore, the consistent
Popularity theory suggests that eBay is overpriced in its offering and should underperform
the market in the long-term. As seen in figure 2.1, this is not the case, as eBay cumulatively
outperformed the S&P 500 by 1,304.92% over the five years post-IPO. eBay was close to a
return similar to the S&P 500 one-month after trading.
Figure 2.1 – eBay Inc’s Raw and Adjusted Returns September 24, 1998 – September
24, 2003
Timeframe
Date of IPO

Return
Raw

S&P 500

Adjusted

162.94%

-2.19%

165.13%

6.02%

2.68%

3.34%

825.30%

22.50%

802.80%

455.42%

-3.77%

459.19%

1,303.61%

-1.31%

1,304.92%

09/24/1998
One Month
09/24/1998 – 10/24/1998
One Year
09/24/1998 – 09/24/1999
Three Years
09/24/1998 – 09/24/2001
Five Years
09/24/1998 – 09/24/2003
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eBay’s outperformance has to do more with the anomalistic nature of the issuing
firm than typical tendencies in the IPO market. While many companies failed to survive the
dot com bubble, eBay was one of few companies that persevered through the crash. This
may have to do with the fact that eBay was already the largest auction site during the boom
and was, therefore, able to achieve a critical mass of users before the market plunged and
investor sentiment turned away from tech-IPOs. In the cases of Amazon and eBay, both
filed for IPO just before the red-hot issuing period of 1999-2000. A compelling study in the
future may be to evaluate the returns of IPOs filed just before a hot issue period to
determine if investors can achieve superior long-term performance during these periods.
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#3 – United Parcel Service (UPS)
Company Background
The United Parcel Service (UPS), founded in 1907, went public nearly a century later
in 1999. By this time, the company had grown into the world’s largest package delivery
company (United Parcel 1999). In 1998 the company had over 330,000 employees and
delivered over three billion packages, resulting in revenue of $24.8 billion and a net income
of $1.7 billion. Being one of the first privatized delivery companies, UPS had an economic
moat in an industry that is exceptionally capitally intensive. In their prospectus, they cite
that their main strategies for growth will come from expanding their domestic business,
along with leveraging their technology to create an advantage for customers to choose
them for e-commerce.
Issuing Period
UPS issued near the height of the dot com bubble in 1999 when the market was
overly excited about IPOs. The average return on IPOs in 1999 was 73% (Ljungqvist,
Wilhelm Jr. 2003), which makes UPS’ 36% first-day return look modest. While UPS itself
was not an e-commerce company, its role as a package delivery service may have
influenced investor excitement as they believed UPS could capitalize on this growing
industry.
Findings
On the first day of trading, UPS stock soared to close 36% above its IPO price.
Volume for the day was 80.8 million, nearly ten times higher than the proceeding onemonth average of 8.6 million. At the time, UPS would be considered a Popular IPO, due to
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its first-day pop and the growth potential of the company. What may have enticed investors
additionally was that the company was already profitable and was well-established. While
the existing maturity of a company can sometimes lower investor expectations about
growth, the correlation of their delivery service to the Internet likely refuted this distaste.
Figure 3.1 – United Parcel Services’ Raw and Adjusted Returns November 11, 1999 –
November 11, 2004
Timeframe
Date of IPO

Return
Raw

S&P 500

Adjusted

36%

0.60%

35.40%

-3.11%

2.52%

-5.63%

-14.10%

1.94%

-16.04%

-8.66%

-34.86%

26.2%

20.50%

-15.24%

35.74%

11/10/1999
One Month
11/10/1999 – 12/10/1999
One Year
11/10/1999 – 11/10/2000
Three Years
11/10/1999 – 11/10/2002
Five Years
11/10/1999 – 11/10/2004

However, contrary to both eBay and Amazon, UPS offered a negative one-year
return even while the S&P 500 produced a positive return, which may hint at an
overpricing on its IPO date due to its popularity (see figure 3.1). On the contrary, UPS
outperformed the broader market by 26.2% and 35.74% three years and five years postIPO, respectively. While this is inconsistent with Popularity, this may be because of the
overall market downturn, rather than UPS’ outperformance. Additionally, investors may
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have still considered it a favorable investment due to its growth potential and consistent
profitability relative to other companies in the market.
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#4 – Stamps.com (STMP)
Company Background
At the time of IPO in 1999, Stamps.com had no revenue; the first such case reviewed
in this paper. However, its business plan was to operate a variety of product and service
lines, selling mainly USPS stamps and postage at a discounted rate and charging a monthly
service fee. The stamps and postage were to be printable from the users' accounts online.
In their prospectus, they note the most significant risk factor is that their product was not
yet approved by USPS, which is crucial to their business model. That said, Stamps.com they
believe that USPS will approve their software-based service (Stamps.com 1999). From
January 9, 1998 – March 31, 1998, Stamps.com suffered an operating loss of $363 million.
Their growth strategy was to be the leading provider in convenient, cost-effective, and easy
use Internet software to provide postage services.
Issuing Period
Filing for IPO on June 25, 1999, Stamps.com issued during what many consider to be
the height of the dot com bubble. The market was in favor of Internet companies at the
time, and Stamps.com fit perfectly into this criterion. Additionally, they would be able to
capitalize on the increased growth in the Internet and e-commerce space, which led to
excitement for investors.
Findings
On the day of its public offering, Stamps.com had over three million in trading
volume, more than three times their proceeding one-month average of 996 thousand. As a
result, the stock price increased by 148.91% (see figure 4.1). This, in addition to the growth
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opportunities mentioned above, leads to the belief that Stamps.com was a Popular IPO
issuing in a period of irrational investor behavior. Stamps.com should experience
underpricing in the short-term that will ultimately lead to overpricing in the long-term.
Figure 4.1 – Stamps.com’s Raw and Adjusted Returns June 25, 1999 – June 25, 2004
Timeframe
Date of IPO

Return
Raw

S&P 500

Adjusted

148.91%

-0.04%

148.95%

222.32%

3.13%

219.19%

-34.23%

9.55%

-43.78%

-68.59%

-25.81%

-42.78%

-62.13%

-13.31%

-48.82%

06/25/1999
One Month
06/25/1999 – 07/25/1999
One Year
06/25/1999 – 06/25/2000
Three Years
06/25/1999 – 06/25/2002
Five Years
06/25/1999 – 06/25/2004

As seen in figure 4.1, this was the case. Stamps.com substantially outperformed the
S&P 500 in both first day and one-month returns, up nearly 220 percent by July 25, 1999.
However, even as the market performed well throughout the following year, Stamps.com’s
stock price fell 34.23 percent. This trend continued throughout their three-year and fiveyear adjusted returns, as the stock closed -62.13 percent down from its first day of trading
on June 25, 2004. This is the first case that is consistent with both Ritter’s IPO long-term
overpricing theory in addition to the Popularity concept. This may be due to the timing of
the IPO, along with Stamps.com’s business model. Stamps.com utilized this hot issuing
period to raise capital despite having no prior revenues. Once investors began behaving
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rationally, they found that they underestimated the risks associated with investing in a
company in its pre-revenue stages. This led to a contraction in investments, ultimately
lowering the stock price in the long-term.
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#5 – Netflix Inc. (NFLX)
Company Background
Netflix began in 1997, but by the time of its IPO was the largest online
entertainment subscription service in the United States with more than 600,000 customers.
At the time, Netflix’s core business model was physically shipping DVD’s and VCR’s to
consumers in exchange for a monthly fee. In their 2002 prospectus, they cite that their
growth is driven by their large selection, high customer satisfaction, and rapid adoption of
DVD players (Netflix Inc., 2002). Their primary belief was that without owning physical
stores, they could cut costs and create a scalable product to expand their subscriber base
quickly. In the year ended December 31, 2001, Netflix had more than $75 million in sales
but operated at a net loss of $38.6 million.
Issuing Period
In 2002, investors had just come out of the shaky dot com bubble, which was fresh
in their minds. A 2002 article written by Steve Gelsi for MarketWatch notes that
“Technology deals are few and far between in the IPO market nowadays –.” He adds that
big IPO deals for investors are “still parse” (Gelsi 2002). This article sheds light on the
behavioral thinking of investors at the time. The issuing period was far from hot, and it was
difficult to find technology companies filing for IPO at all. This was a far stretch from where
the market had been just a few years earlier.
Findings
On May 23, 2002, Netflix went public and had a volume of 105 million, compared to
an average size of 9.5 million for the following month. While the volume had spiked,
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Netflix’s share price only jumped 12.00% on the day of IPO (see figure 5.1), a modest
return compared to those seen during the dot com bubble. That said, it came less than a
year after a recession in which the market pulled back on sentiment for technology IPOs.
Given implied investor sentiment, along with Netflix earning a lower than the historical
average (16.4%) on its first-day pop, Netflix was Unpopular. As a result, the stock price is
undervalued in the short-term and will lead to a higher long-term return.
Figure 5.1 – Netflix Inc’s Raw and Adjusted Returns May 23, 2002 – May 23, 2007
Timeframe
Date of IPO

Return
Raw

S&P 500

Adjusted

12.00%

1.02%

10.98%

-18.33%

-8.92%

-9.41%

31.67%

-14.07%

45.74%

85.00%

9.93%

75.07%

174.17%

40.34%

133.83%

05/23/2002
One Month
05/23/2002 – 06/23/2002
One Year
05/23/2002 – 05/23/2003
Three Years
05/23/2002 – 05/23/2005
Five Years
05/23/2002 – 05/23/2007

In the case of Netflix, this was what happened. After suffering a one-month adjusted
return of -9.41%, Netflix’s stock price bounced back in years one, three, and five to
significantly outperform the broader market by 45.74%, 75.07%, and 133.83%,
respectively. While this fits the Popularity concept, other stock-specific characteristics may
have also influenced this result. Specifically, in their prospectus, Netflix makes no note
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about the potential move to an online streaming service. Once this occurred, scaling was
much more achievable, and operating costs reduced drastically.
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#6 – Axis Capital Holdings LTD (AXS)
Company Background
Founded in 2001, Axis Capital provides specialty lines insurance and treaty
reinsurance, headquartered in Bermuda. In their 2003 prospectus, Axis Capital notes that
they had $1.1 billion in gross premiums and generated net income of $107.1 million.
Specialty lines insurance relates to risks involved in items such as terrorism, marine and
aviation war threat, and political uncertainties, among others. Axis Capital also highlight
their strategies, which include managing a diverse portfolio of specialty risks and highly
disciplined underwriting practices.
Issuing Period
As mentioned in the above Netflix case, the market was still recovering from the
irrationality during the dot com boom. That said, Axis Capital’s July 2003 IPO was a little
more than a year removed from Netflix. In this time, David Westenberg of WilmerHale
notes in an article that while there were only seven IPOs in the United States in the first half
of 2003, there were 64 in the following six months. Of the IPOs in 2003, 21 percent were
offerings by financial services and insurance companies (Westenberg 2004). Additionally,
56 of the 71 IPOs in 2003 traded at or above their offering price by year-end. Overall, the
market sentiment toward IPOs appeared to be trending upward in the latter half of the
year.
Findings
Axis Capital traded with a volume of 11.6 million during its first day of trading (July
01, 2003), higher than its proceeding one-month average volume of one million.
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Additionally, the price jumped 16.14% during its first day of trading, much higher than the
broader market return of only 0.80%. My initial thesis was that Axis Capital was
Unpopular. However, given its first-day pop that is only 26 BPS from the average and
growing implied investor sentiment in the IPO market in the second half of 2003, it appears
that Axis was, in fact, Popular. Therefore, Axis should be underpriced in the short-term but
overvalued in the long-term.
Figure 6.1 – Axis Capital Holdings’ Raw and Adjusted Returns July 01, 2003 – July 01,
2008
Timeframe
Date of IPO

Return
Raw

S&P 500

Adjusted

16.14%

0.80%

15.34%

-0.20%

0.58%

-0.78%

9.35%

15.85%

-6.50%

14.09%

30.34%

-16.25%

17.14%

31.35%

-14.21%

07/01/2003
One Month
07/01/2003 – 08/01/2003
One Year
07/01/2003 – 07/01/2004
Three Years
07/01/2003 – 07/01/2006
Five Years
07/01/2003 – 07/01/2008

As seen in figure 6.1, this appears to be the case. Axis Capital’s share price
underperformed the broader market in each period examined after its IPO, which is
consistent with the Popularity concept. An explanation may be that nothing significantly
changed from their strategies in the prospectus throughout their first five years operating
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as a public entity, resulting in decreased investor interest in the company after its first day
of trading.
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#7 – Google Inc. - now Alphabet Inc. (GOOGL)
Company Background
Google was founded in 1998 and by 2004 was a global leader in web search and
advertising. Their revenue model is selling targeted advertisements to advertisers. In 1999
Google was not profitable; in the year ended December 31, 2003, Google generated $105.6
in net income on revenues of $1.46 billion (Google Inc. 2004). At the time, Google still faced
significant competition from both Microsoft and Yahoo. Additionally, more than 98% of
their revenue came from advertising, which they mention is a risk if reductions in
advertising spending took place.
Issuing Period
By 2004, the IPO market was four years removed from the dot com bubble, and the
IPO market was heating up. A CNN Money article in September 2004 by Mark Gongloff
notes that new offerings had gained an average 10 percent for the year, outperforming the
broader market. 2004 also had the most significant number of IPOs since 2000 with 140
offerings. Overall, the IPO market was in a better place than in recent years, albeit still not
as hot as the dot com period.
Findings
Google was one of the most highly anticipated IPOs of all time as they were a
profitable high-growth company with a proven business model. As a result, the company
had a first-day trading volume of nearly 45 million compared to a proceeding 11 million
one-month average, as the stock gained an adjusted 18.41 percent. Given the positive
implied investor sentiment toward the company, in addition to its first-day pop, there is no

61

denying that Google was a Popular IPO. For this reason, they should be underpriced in the
short-term but overpriced in the long-term.
Figure 7.1 – Google (Alphabet Inc’s) Raw and Adjusted Returns August 19, 2004 –
August 19, 2009
Timeframe
Date of IPO

Return
Raw

S&P 500

Adjusted

18.05%

-0.36%

18.41%

17.08%

3.42%

13.66%

179.05%

11.77%

167.28%

398.34%

32.51%

365.83%

342.47%

-9.31%

351.78%

08/19/2004
One Month
08/19/2004 – 09/19/2004
One Year
08/19/2004 – 08/19/2005
Three Years
08/19/2004 – 08/19/2007
Five Years
08/19/2004 – 08/19/2009

As shown in figure 7.1, Google outperformed the broader market in every period
studied. This is not consistent with the Popularity concept, although this is due to the
anomalistic nature of Google’s business model. Over the five years post-IPO, Google’s
competitors struggled to keep up with their explosive gains in market share. Additionally,
Google expanded its lines of business, as well as acquiring YouTube in 2006. The sheer
growth of the company was something that Google hinted at in their prospectus, and that is
likely why the stock never dipped below their IPO price.
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#8 – Domino’s Pizza Inc. (DPZ)
Company Background
Domino’s Pizza was founded in 1960, although it did not go public until 44 years
later. By 2004, Domino’s was the number one pizza delivery company in the United States.
As per their prospectus, Domino’s had $1.33 billion in net revenues resulting in $46 million
net income for the fiscal year 2003 (Domino’s Pizza 2004). Domino’s most considerable
strengths were in their growth model (franchises), and their existing profitability pre-IPO.
However, risks to be considered were its competition in a highly competitive industry, and
quick changes in consumer preferences could significantly hurt their business.
Issuing Period
Filing just a month before Google Inc., the issuing period was largely heating up.
Investors were recovering from the shocks post-dot com boom and were willing to get back
into the market. There was also a recovery in the first-day pop prices, with the average IPO
gaining 10% on the first day of trading for quarter one – quarter three, 2004 (Gangloff
2004).

Findings
Domino’s Pizza had a first-day trading volume of 15 million, much higher than their
proceeding one-month average of 1.4 million. That said, the stock price dropped 3.57
percent from its initial price. Citing a Forbes article from after-hours on the first day of
trading, Domino’s Pizza did not deliver a strong IPO. It appears that other than their strong
brand name, the prospectus did not deliver anything else exciting for investors. Given the
above evaluation, Domino’s was an Unpopular IPO. If consistent with Popularity, this would
result in a superior long-term return.
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Figure 8.1 – Domino’s Pizza Inc’s Raw and Adjusted Returns July 13, 2004 – July 13,
2009
Timeframe
Date of IPO

Return
Raw

S&P 500

Adjusted

-3.57%

-0.07%

-3.50%

-0.74%

-4.51%

3.77%

77.04%

9.70%

67.34%

37.33%

36.53%

0.80%

-44.51%

-21.16%

-23.35%

07/13/2004
One Month
07/13/2004 – 08/13/2004
One Year
07/13/2004 – 07/13/2005
Three Years
07/13/2004 – 07/13/2007
Five Years
07/13/2004 – 07/13/2009

In reference to figure 8.1, Domino’s stock experienced volatile adjusted returns
from one year, three years, and five years post-IPO. One year post-IPO, the company was
strongly outperforming the S&P 500 benchmark. However, by 2009, DPZ was
underperforming by nearly 25 percent. It appears that Domino’s returns were inconsistent
with the Popularity concept as it underperformed in the long-term while also
underperforming in the short-term. That said, if one were to look beyond the scope of five
years, Domino’s has dramatically outperformed the broader market starting in 2010, with a
1,800 percent return from its IPO price to 15 years later. This may imply that the “longterm” return for a company is not captured within a five-year scope, and further studies
require a longer timeframe is needed.
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#9 – Facebook Inc. (FB)
Company Background
Facebook Inc. began in 2004 by founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg. As per their
2012 prospectus, Facebook is a social networking platform with over 900 million monthly
active users (MAUs). Facebook leverages its massive user base to serve as a platform for
advertisers based on their desired demographics from a users’ profile. At the time, it was
unique for Advertisers to be able to target such specific audiences. The company had a net
income of $1 billion on nearly $4 billion in revenue for the year ended 2011. One of the
most considerable uncertainties for Facebook was to be able to maintain relevance in an
ever-growing competitive market.
Issuing Period
In 2012, the world was just a few years removed from the financial crisis, and the
economy was in recovery. There were many uncertainties regarding the budget of the
United States and the European debt crisis. According to Karina Frayter of CNBC in 2011,
analysts were skeptical of web-based IPOs without proven business models and believed
that their offerings might disappoint investors. Overall, the market seemed weary from the
losses suffered during the great recession, and investors were not eager to jump on
unproven companies.
Findings
Facebook traded with a first-day volume of over 500 million compared with an
average of 81 million for the month. Despite this, the company only gained a mere 0.61
percent on its first day. It appears the 2011 predictions were right, and investors were not
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ready to enter the technology IPO space. Suffice to say that despite Facebook being an
anticipated IPO, it was Unpopular, and the market was unprepared. According to the
Popularity concept, this should result in a lower short-term return, followed by a higher
long-term performance.
Figure 9.1 – Facebook Inc’s Raw and Adjusted Returns May 18, 2012 – May 18, 2012
Timeframe
Date of IPO

Return
Raw

S&P 500

Adjusted

0.61%

-0.76%

1.37%

-21.71%

3.83%

-25.54%

-31.34%

28.74%

-60.08%

111.56%

64.39%

47.17%

278.89%

81.98%

196.91%

05/18/2012
One Month
05/18/2012 – 06/18/2012
One Year
05/18/2012 – 05/18/2013
Three Years
05/18/2012 – 05/18/2015
Five Years
05/18/2012 – 05/18/2017

As seen in figure 9.1, the company’s share price had retreated an adjusted 60.08
percent one year after going public. However, in the following three- and five-year periods,
Facebook outperformed the market by 47.17 and 196.91 percent, respectively. Facebook’s
case is consistent with the Popularity concept. When looking for possible explanations
outside of Popularity, investors may not have understood the high-profit nature of their
business model. Additionally, with the broader market also performing well, investors may
have built a more extensive risk tolerance than at the time of IPO, which drew more
investment into Facebook.

66

#10 – Twitter Inc. (TWTR)
Company Background
Twitter Inc. began in 2006, filing for IPO seven years later in 2013. Like Facebook,
Twitter is a social networking company. By 2013, the company had accumulated more than
215 million monthly active users (MAUs). One way that Twitter portrays itself as different
from Facebook is that they have platform partners such as media outlets that display media
content. These partners do not directly generate revenue for Twitter but instead allow
generated network effects to enhance the user experience which increases advertiser
spend positively. At the time of IPO, Twitter was multiplying, with a 198 percent increase in
revenue from 2011 to 2012 (Twitter Inc. 2004). However, Twitter was operating at a net
loss of nearly $80 million in the year ended December 31, 2012.
Issuing Period
A lot changed in the IPO market from 2012 to 2013. Two hundred twenty-two
companies went public, which was the most since 2000. Technology IPOs made up 45 of
the 222, with the average first-day “pop” returns at 17% (Keating 2014). Additionally, the
general market was transitioning into from recovery into expansion and implied investor
sentiment was high. 2014 was a hot issue period in the IPO market.
Findings
Twitter had a first-day trading volume of 117 million compared to 14.8 million for
the proceeding month. The stock price also jumped 72.69 percent, making it one of the best
IPO first-day returns in 2013. Twitter presented an opportunity for investors who may
have felt that they missed out on Facebook’s IPO, this time in a more robust market. Given
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their first day spike in trading, Twitter is undoubtedly considered Popular. This means the
company should be overvalued in the long-term.
Figure 10.1 – Twitter Inc’s Raw and Adjusted Returns November 07, 2013 –
November 07, 2018
Timeframe
Date of IPO

Return
Raw

S&P 500

Adjusted

72.69%

-1.33%

74.02%

0.11%

3.32%

-3.21%

-10.22%

16.30%

-26.52%

-60.00%

22.00%

-82%

-23.34%

57.71%

-81.05%

11/07/2013
One Month
11/07/2013 – 12/07/2013
One Year
11/07/2013 – 11/07/2014
Three Years
11/07/2013 – 11/07/2016
Five Years
11/07/2013 – 11/07/2018

Twitter’s IPO case is consistent with Popularity. As seen in figure 10.1, Twitter only
outperformed the broader market on its first-day pop and has dropped in each period
since. While investors may have been excited about the company at the time of IPO, there is
growing concern about the profitability of Twitter. On the contrary, Facebook performed
exceedingly well during this time, already having a larger user base and a net income.
Perhaps investors lost interest in Twitter and shifted attention to Facebook, resulting in a
large difference in returns.
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#11 – Shake Shack Inc. (SHAK)
Company Background
Shake Shack was founded in 2004 and went public 11 years later in 2015. Shake
Shack brands itself as a modern burger chain, serving classic American food such as
burgers, hot dogs, and shakes. The company’s business model includes a combination of
both company-owned and franchised locations. At the time of the prospectus Shake Shack
had a total of 63 stores, 31 being company-owned, five domestically licensed, and 27
internationally licensed (Shake Shack 2014). Their focus is on building stores in densely
populated areas such as New York City. Shake Shack mentions that it is in its early stages of
growth, with plans for 450 company-owned stores and growing their presence
internationally. In doing so, they also hope to improve same-store sales growth
significantly as Shake Shack increases its brand awareness. For the fiscal year ended
December 25, 2013, Shake Shack had revenue of $82.4 million, resulting in net income of
$5.4 million. Most of this revenue came from sales at their company-owned locations, with
licensing revenue accounting for only 5 percent of sales.
Issuing Period
The issuing period of 2015 had 170 total IPOs, which was substantially lower from
2014, where 244 companies went public (Renaissance Capital 2016). The 2015 IPO market
was a disappointment to investors who were looking for a continuation of the past two
years of hot issue periods. The average return for IPOs during this period was down two
percent for the year. When looking for explanations, uncertainties remained in both the
Federal Reserve and European monetary policies, which likely drove down IPO returns.
Still, there were winners in this period. Overall, while the market was not a hot issuing
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period, there is reason to believe that excitement remained in the IPO market stemming
from significant gains in 2014 and 2015.
Findings
Shake Shack had a first-day trading volume of over 16 million, much higher than its
proceeding one-month average of 1.5 million. Additionally, the stock had a first day “pop”
of 108.64 percent, making it one of the best IPOs of 2015. Given the growth opportunities
of the company, Shake Shack is considered a Popular stock at the time of IPO. This should
result in a high short-term return, followed by a long-term overpricing.
Figure 11.1 – Shake Shacks’ Raw and Adjusted Returns January 30, 2015 – January
30, 2020
Timeframe
Date of IPO

Return
Raw

S&P 500

Adjusted

108.64%

-1.21%

109.85%

-5.99%

5.50%

-11.49%

-24.66%

-2.74%

-21.92%

-5.47%

41.48%

-46.95%

48.37%

64.08%

-15.71%

01/30/2015
One Month
01/30/2015 – 02/30/2015
One Year
01/30/2015 – 01/30/2016
Three Years
01/30/2015 – 01/30/2018
Five Years
01/30/2015 – 01/30/2020

As seen in figure 11.1, Shake Shack underperformed the S&P 500 in the following
four periods examined after its IPO. Even though the stock had gained 48.37 percent five
years after it went public, Shake Shack’s adjusted return was still lower than the
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benchmark S&P 500. This is consistent with the Popularity concept, implying that investors
were overconfident about Shake Shack’s growth opportunities.

71

#12 – Snap Inc. (SNAP)
Company Background
In its 2017 prospectus, Snap Inc. describes itself as a camera company. It launched
in 2011 as a social networking application. Snapchat is its flagship product, with 158
million daily active users (DAUs) and 2.5 billion Snaps sent every day (Snap Inc. 2017). In
addition to their app, Snap also works to develop “Spectacles,” which they view as the
augmented reality glasses of the future. However, these are not a significant revenue
stream at the time of the prospectus. Most of Snap’s revenue is generated through
advertising on the application. For the year ended December 31, 2016, Snap had revenue of
$400 million, with a net loss of $514 million. While they were not profitable, the company
detailed considerable growth opportunities for the future.
Issuing Period
By 2017 the markets were now nearly a decade removed from the financial crisis.
After rough periods in 2015 and 2016, the IPO market appeared to be bouncing back in
2017. There were a total of 160 IPOs in 2017, led mainly by technology and biotechnology
companies (Deagon 2017). Overall, 2017 was a hot issue period stemming from new
excitement given the recovery in the IPO market.
Findings
Snap Inc. had a first-day trading volume of over 217 million, compared to a
proceeding one-month average of about 47 million. Snap was a highly anticipated IPO with
investors seeing what they missed out on with Facebook and wanting to reap the benefits.
As a result, the stock price jumped 44 percent during its first day of trading. Snap Inc. was a

72

Popular IPO given its first day “pop,” along with the anticipation of its public offering.
According to the Popularity concept, Snap should be overpriced in the long-term.
Figure 12.1 – Snap Inc’s Raw and Adjusted Returns March 02, 2017 – March 02, 2020
Timeframe
Date of IPO

Return
Raw

S&P 500

Adjusted

44.00%

-0.54%

44.54%

-7.97%

-0.81%

-7.16%

-26.43%

12.99%

-39.42%

-41.22%

24.03%

-65.25%

Null

Null

Null

03/02/2017
One Month
03/02/2017 – 04/02/2017
One Year
03/02/2017 – 03/02/2018
Three Years
03/02/2017 – 03/02/2020
Five Years
03/02/2017 – 03/02/2022

Snap Inc’s return is consistent with Popularity. As seen in figure 12.1, the company
underperformed the benchmark in each of the following three periods examined since the
IPO. Investors may have lost interest post-IPO, as Snapchat suffered consecutive periods of
declining DAU growth. While figure 12.1 only has data for the first three years of Snap Inc.,
if consistent with Popularity, the company will remain below the benchmark return for the
five years ending March 02, 2022. I hypothesize that this will be the case.
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CONCLUSION
Out of the twelve cases examined, seven were consistent with the Popularity
concept. The dot com period had four Popular issuing firms, with two and three in the post
dot com period and the app period, respectively. A total of nine IPOs studied were Popular,
compared to three that were Unpopular. When aggregating the data, it appears that the
Popular IPOs outperformed the Unpopular IPOs in each of the five periods examined, as
shown in figure 13.1, compared to figure 13.2. However, further analysis of figure 13.1
shows that both AMZN and EBAY are significant outliers in the data, particularly in years
three and five. As mentioned in the above cases, these are anomalistic companies, which
led to the omittance of both issuing firms from figure 13.3.
Figure 13.1 – Popular Average S&P 500 – Adjusted Returns
AMZN

EBAY

UPS

STMP

AXS

GOOG

TWTR

SHAK

SNAP

AVG

30.0%
IPO
Date
-25.3%
One
Month
262%
One
Year
Three 2,574%
Years
734 %
Five
Years

165%

35.4%

149%

15.3%

18.4%

74.0%

110%

44.5%

71%

3.34%

-5.63%

219%

-0.78%

13.7%

-3.21%

-11.5%

-7.2%

20%

803%

-16.0% -43.8% -6.50%

167%

-26.5%

-21.9%

-39%

119%

459%

26.2%

-42.8% -16.3%

366%

-82.0%

-47.0%

-65%

352%

1,305%

35.7%

-48.8% -14.2%

352%

-81.05%

-15.7%

TBD

283%

Figure 13.2 – Unpopular Average S&P 500 – Adjusted Returns

IPO
Date

NFLX

DPZ

FB

AVG

11.0%

-3.50%

1.37%

2.95%
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One
Month
One
Year
Three
Years
Five
Years

-9.41%

3.77%

-25.5%

-10.4%

45.7%

67.3%

-60.1%

17.7%

75.1%

0.8%

47.2%

41%

133%

-23.4%

197%

102%

Figure 13.3 – Popular Average S&P 500 – Adjusted Returns, Null Outliers
UPS

STMP

AXS

35.4% 149% 15.3%
IPO
Date
-5.63% 219% -0.78%
One
Month
-16.0% -43.8% -6.50%
One
Year
Three 26.2% -42.8% -16.3%
Years
35.7% -48.8% -14.2%
Five
Years

GOOG

TWTR

SHAK

SNAP

AVG

18.4%

74.0%

110%

44.5%

63.8%

13.7%

-3.21%

-11.5%

-7.2%

29.2%

167%

-26.5%

-21.9%

-39%

1.87%

366%

-82.0%

-47.0%

-65%

19.8%

352%

-81.05%

-15.7%

TBD

38.0%

When adjusting for the outliers in figure 13.3, Popularity is apparent in the results.
As shown graphically in figure 13.4, the Unpopular stocks produced a low first-day pop
and a negative one-month return, followed by positive returns one year, three years, and
five years post-IPO. On the contrary, Popular stocks have a high first-day pop, though fall
lower in one month and one year returns. Then, they have an increased year three and year
five return, albeit significantly lower than the unpopular stocks (19.8% versus 41% and
38% versus 102% in years three and five, respectively). It is important to note that these
are adjusted returns, so both the Popular and Unpopular IPOs significantly outperformed
the broader S&P 500 index.
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Figure 13.4

Unpopular vs. Popular Returns (Null Outliers)
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While the initial case study data lacks conclusiveness with only seven of twelve
consistent with Popularity, evaluating the adjusted averages reveals that Popularity is
apparent in the IPO market. However, it is essential to mention the shortcomings of this
study, which include a minimal amount of cases (only three Unpopular) and the need to
omit two out of twelve results. In future studies, it would be useful to evaluate longer-term
returns. Additionally, a more qualitative set of Popularity characteristics in the IPO market
may also increase the validity of this examination.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Residual Return against Market Value
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Appendix 2: Real Stock Prices and Present Values of Subsequent Real
Dividends (annual data)
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Appendix 3: Popularity-Based Explanations of Premiums and Anomalies
Premium/Anomaly
Characteristic/

Popularity based explanation

Dimension of
Popularity
Equity Premium

Stocks are riskier than safe assets. Risk is unpopular.

Size

Small cap stocks are riskier than large cap stocks, as well as less liquid, less
well covered, and have lower investment “capacity.”

Value

Value stocks are often out of favor (unpopular), less well known, and / or
operating in less glamorous industries.

Liquidity

Investors prefer more liquidity to less.

Risk Anomalies

Severe Downside Risk: Investors dislike large losses. Low Vol/Beta:
Active managers prefer high beta stocks in hopes of outperforming
benchmarks.

Environmental, Social,

Investors avoid 'sin stocks' and seek out ‘responsible’ investments.

and Governance (ESG)
Competitive Advantage,

Stocks with desirable attributes -- competitive advantage, brand power, or

Brand, and Reputation

firm reputation -- are sought out beyond their economic benefits.

Momentum

Attention causing event creates more interest, increases trading activity
and liquidity, resulting in an unsustainable virtuous mispricing cycle.

Source: Based on Exhibit 1 in Idzorek and Ibbotson (2017).
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Appendix 4: Growth of $1 for Equally Weighted Quartiles Based on
Interbrand’s BV Rankings, April 2000 – August 2017 (log scale)

Source: Based on figure 6.1 in IIKX (2018)
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Appendix 5: Growth of $1 for the Three Equally Weighted Portfolios Based on
Morningstar Economic Moat Ratings, July 2002 – August 2017 (log scale)

Source: Based on figure 6.3 in IIKX (2018).
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Appendix 6: Growth of $1 for the Equally Weighted Quartile Portfolios Based
on Harris Poll RQs, April 2000 – August 3028 (Log Scale)

Source: Based on figure 6.4 in IIKX (2018).
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Appendix 7: Growth of $1 for Equally Weighted Quartile Portfolios Based on
Coskewness, January 1996 – August 2017 (log scale)

Source: Based on figure 6.5 in IIKX (2018).
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